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Abstract—Despite the impressive performances reported by
deep neural networks in different application domains, they
remain largely vulnerable to adversarial examples, i.e., input
samples that are carefully perturbed to cause misclassification at
test time. In this work, we propose a deep neural rejection mech-
anism to detect adversarial examples, based on the idea of re-
jecting samples that exhibit anomalous feature representations at
different network layers. With respect to competing approaches,
our method does not require generating adversarial examples
at training time, and it is less computationally demanding. To
properly evaluate our method, we define an adaptive white-box
attack that is aware of the defense mechanism and aims to bypass
it. Under this worst-case setting, we empirically show that our
approach outperforms previously-proposed methods that detect
adversarial examples by only analyzing the feature representation
provided by the output network layer.
I. INTRODUCTION
Despite their impressive performances on a variety of tasks,
it has been known for more than a decade that machine-
learning algorithms can be misled by different adversarial
attacks, staged either at training or at test time [1], [2].
After the first attacks proposed against linear classifiers in
2004 [3], [4], Biggio et.al. [5], [6] have been the first to
show that nonlinear machine-learning algorithms, including
support vector machines (SVMs) and neural networks, can be
misled by gradient-based optimization attacks [1]. Neverthe-
less, such vulnerabilities of learning algorithms have become
extremely popular only after that Szegedy et.al. [7], [8] have
demonstrated that also deep learning algorithms exhibiting
superhuman performances on image classification tasks suffer
from the same problems. They have shown that even only
slightly-manipulating the pixels of an input image can be
sufficient to induce deep neural networks to misclassify its
content. Such attacks have then been popularized under the
name of adversarial examples [2], [6], [7].
Since the seminal work by Szegedy et.al. [7], [8], many
defense methods have been proposed to mitigate the threat
of adversarial examples. Most of the proposed defenses have
been shown to be ineffective against more sophisticated attacks
(i.e., attacks that are aware of the defense mechanism), leaving
the problem of defending neural networks against adversarial
examples still open. According to [2], the most promising
defenses can be broadly categorized into two families. The
first includes approaches based on robust optimization and
game-theoretical models [9]–[11]. These approaches, which
also encompass adversarial training [8], explicitly model
the interactions between the classifier and the attacker to
learn robust classifiers. The underlying idea is to incorporate
knowledge of potential attacks during training. The second
family of defenses (complementary to the first) is based on
the idea of rejecting samples that exhibit an outlying behavior
with respect to unperturbed training data [12]–[16].
In this work, we focus on defenses based on rejection
mechanisms and try to improve their effectiveness. In fact,
it has been shown that only relying upon the feature represen-
tation learned by the last network layer to reject adversarial
examples is not sufficient [12], [13]. In particular, it happens
that adversarial examples become indistinguishable from sam-
ples of the target class at such a higher representation level
even for small input perturbations. To overcome this issue,
we propose here a defense mechanism, named Deep Neural
Rejection (DNR), based on analyzing the representations of
input samples at different network layers, and on rejecting
samples which exhibit anomalous behavior with respect to
that observed from the training data at such layers (Sect. II).
With respect to similar approaches based on analyzing differ-
ent network layers [14], [15], our defense does not require
generating adversarial examples during training, and it is thus
less computationally demanding.
We evaluate our defense against an adaptive white-box
attacker that is aware of the defense mechanism and tries
to bypass it. To this end, we propose a novel gradient-based
attack that accounts for the rejection mechanism and aims to
craft adversarial examples that avoid it (Sect. III).
It is worth remarking here that correctly evaluating a defense
mechanism is a crucial point when proposing novel defenses
against adversarial examples [2], [17]. The majority of previ-
ous work proposing defense methods against adversarial exam-
ples has only evaluated such defenses against previous attacks
rather than against an ad-hoc attack crafted specifically against
the proposed defense (see, e.g., [15], [18], [19] and all the
other re-evaluated defenses in [17], [20]). The problem with
these black-box and gray-box evaluations in which the attack
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is essentially unaware of the defense mechanism is that they
are overly optimistic. It has indeed been shown afterwards that
such defenses can be easily bypassed by simple modifications
to the attack algorithm [17], [20], [21]. For instance, many
defenses have been found to perform gradient obfuscation,
i.e., they learn functions which are harder to optimize for
gradient-based attacks; however, they can be easily bypassed
by constructing a smoother, differentiable approximation of
their function, e.g., via learning a surrogate model [2], [6],
[22]–[25] or replacing network layers which obfuscate gradi-
ents with smoother mappings [17], [20], [21]. In our case, an
attack that is unaware of the defense mechanism may tend to
craft adversarial examples in areas of the input space which
are assigned to the rejection class; thus, such attacks, as well
as previously-proposed ones, may rarely bypass our defense.
For this reason, we believe that our adaptive white-box attack,
along with the security evaluation methodology adopted in this
work, provide another significant contribution to the state of
the art related to the problem of properly evaluating defenses
against adversarial examples.
The security evaluation methodology advocated in [2], [17],
[26], which we also adopt in this work, consists of evaluating
the accuracy of the system against attacks crafted with an
increasing amount of perturbation. The corresponding security
evaluation curve [2] shows how gracefully the performance
decreases while the attack increases in strength, up to the point
where the defense reaches zero accuracy. This is another im-
portant phenomenon to be observed, since any defense against
test-time evasion attacks has to fail when the perturbation is
sufficiently large (or, even better, unbounded); in fact, in the
unbounded case, the attacker can ideally replace the source
sample with any other sample from another class [17]. If
accuracy under attack does not reach zero for very large
perturbations, then it may be that the attack algorithm fails to
find a good optimum (i.e., a good adversarial example). This
in turn means that we are probably providing an optimistic
evaluation of the defense. As suggested in [17], the purpose
of a security evaluation should not be to show which attacks
the defense withstands to, but rather to show when the defense
fails. If one shows that only very large perturbations that
substantially compromise the content of the input samples
and its nature (i.e., its true label) are required to break the
defense, then we can retain the defense mechanism to be
sufficiently robust. Another relevant point is to show that such
a breakdown point occurs at a larger perturbation than that
exhibited by competing defenses, to show that the proposed
defense is more robust than previously-proposed ones.
The empirical evaluation reported in Sect. IV, using both
MNIST handwritten digits and CIFAR10 images, provides
consistent results with the aforementioned aspects. First, it
shows that our adaptive white-box attack is able to break
our defensive method only at very large perturbations (which
significantly alter the initial content of the input samples,
requiring the attack to mimic the target class). Second, it shows
that our method outperforms competing rejection mechanisms
which only leverage the deep representation learned at the
output network layer.
We conclude the paper by discussing related work (Sect. V),
and the main contributions of this work along with promising
future research directions (Sect. VI).
II. DEEP NEURAL REJECTION
The underlying idea of our DNR method is to estimate the
distribution of unperturbed training points at different network
layers, and reject anomalous samples that may be incurred at
test time, including adversarial examples. The architecture of
DNR is shown in Fig. 1.
Before delving into the details of our method, let us intro-
duce some notation. We denote the prediction function of a
deep neural network with f : X 7→ Y , where X ⊆ Rd is
the d-dimensional space of input samples (e.g., image pixels)
and Y ⊆ Rc is the space of the output predictions (i.e.,
the estimated confidence values for each class), being c the
number of classes. If we assume that the network consists of m
layers, then the prediction function f can be rewritten to make
this explicit as: f(φ1(φ2(. . . φm(x;wm);w2);w1), where φ1
and φm denote the mapping function learned respectively by
the output and the input layer, and w1 and wm are their weight
parameters (learned during training).
For our defense mechanism to work, one has first to select
a set of network layers; e.g., in Fig. 1 we select the outer
layers φ1, φ2 and φ3. Let us assume that the representation
of the input sample x at level φi is zi. Then, on each
of these selected representations, DNR learns an SVM with
the RBF kernel gi(zi), trying to correctly predict the input
sample. The confidence values on the c classes provided by
this classifier are then concatenated with those provided by
the other base SVMs, and used to train a combiner, using
again an RBF SVM.1 The combiner will output predictions
s1, . . . , sc for the c classes, but will reject samples if the
maximum confidence score maxk=1,...,c sk is not higher than
a rejection threshold θ. This decision rule can be compactly
represented as: arg maxk=0,...,c sk(x), where we define an
additional, constant output s0(x) = θ for the rejection class.
According to this rule, if s0(x) = θ is the highest value in
the set, the sample is rejected; otherwise, it is assigned to the
class exhibiting the larger confidence value.
As proposed in [12], we use an RBF SVM here to ensure
that the confidence values s1, . . . , sc, for each given class, de-
crease while x moves further away from regions of the feature
space which are densely populated by training samples of that
class. This property, named compact abating probability in
open-set problems [13], [28], is a desirable property to easily
implement a distance-based rejection mechanism as the one
required in our case to detect outlying samples. With respect
to [12], we train this combiner on top of other base classifiers
rather than only on the representation learned by the last
network layer, to further improve the detection of adversarial
examples. For this reason, in the following we refer to the
1Validation samples should be used to train the combiner here and avoid
overfitting, as suggested by stacked generalization [27].
approach by Melis et.al. [12], rejecting samples based only on
their representation at the last layer, as Neural Rejection (NR);
and to ours, exploiting also representations from other layers,
as Deep Neural Rejection (DNR).
III. ATTACKING DEEP NEURAL REJECTION
To properly evaluate security, or adversarial robustness,
of rejection-based defenses against adaptive white-box adver-
sarial examples, we propose the following. Given a source
sample x and a maximum-allowed ε-sized perturbation, the
attacker can optimize a defense-aware adversarial example x?
by solving the following constrained optimization problem:
x? = arg min
x′:‖x−x′‖≤ε
Ω(x) = max
i∈{0,y}
si(x
′)− max
j 6∈{0,y}
sj(x
′) ,(1)
where ‖x − x′‖ ≤ ε is an `p-norm constraint (typical norms
used for crafting adversarial examples are `1, `2 and `∞, for
which efficient projection algorithms exist [29]), y ∈ Y =
{1, . . . , c} is the true class, and 0 is the rejection class. In
practice, the attacker will minimize the output on either the
true or reject class to avoid that the sample is either correctly
classified or rejected, while maximizing the output on the
closest competing class (excluding the aforementioned two)
to achieve (untargeted) evasion. This amounts to performing
a strong maximum-confidence evasion attack (rather than
searching for a minimum-distance adversarial example). We
refer the reader to [2], [6], [24] for a more detailed discussion
on such topic. While we focus here on untargeted (error-
generic) attacks, our formulation can be extended to account
for targeted (error-specific) evasion as also done in [12].
The optimization problem in Eq. (1) can be solved through a
standard projected gradient descent (PGD) algorithm, as given
in Algorithm 1.
Algorithm 1 PGD-based Maximum-confidence Adversarial
Examples
Input: x0: the input sample; η: the step size; Π: a projection
operator on the `p-norm constraint ‖x0−x′‖ ≤ ε; t > 0:
a small positive number to ensure convergence.
Output: x′: the adversarial example.
1: x′ ← x0
2: repeat
3: x← x′
4: x′ ← Π (x− η∇Ω(x))
5: until |Ω(x′)− Ω(x)| ≤ t
6: return x′
In Fig. 2 we report an example on a bi-dimensional toy
problem to show how our defense-aware attack works against
a rejection-based defense mechanism.
IV. EXPERIMENTAL ANALYSIS
In this section, we evaluate the security of the proposed
DNR method against adaptive, defense-aware adversarial ex-
amples2. We consider two common computer-vision bench-
marks for this task, i.e., handwritten digit recognition (MNIST
2We have implemented our code using the SecML library [30]
data) and image classification (CIFAR10 data). Our goal is to
investigate whether and to which extent DNR can improve se-
curity against adversarial examples; in particular, compared to
the previously-proposed neural rejection (NR) defense (which
only leverages the feature representation learned at the last
network layer to reject adversarial examples) [12].
A. Experimental Setup
We discuss here the experimental setup used to evaluate our
defense mechanism.
Datasets. As mentioned before, we run experiments on
MNIST and CIFAR10 data. MNIST handwritten digit data
consists of 60,000 training and 10,000 test gray-scale 28x28
images. CIFAR10 consists of 50,000 training and 10,000
test RGB 32x32 images. We normalized the images of both
datasets in [0,1] by simply dividing the input pixel values by
255.
Train-test splits. We average the results on five different runs.
In each run, we consider 10,000 training samples and 1,000
test samples, randomly drawn from the corresponding datasets.
The deep neural networks (DNNs) used in our experiments are
pre-trained on a separate split of 30,000 and 40,000 training
samples, respectively for MNIST and CIFAR10.
Classifiers. We compare the DNR approach (which imple-
ments rejection here based on the representations learned by
three different network layers) against an undefended DNN
(without any rejection mechanism) and against the NR defense
by Melis et.al. [12] (which implements rejection on top of
the representation learned by the output network layer). To
implement the undefended DNNs for the MNIST dataset, we
used the same architecture suggested by Carlini et.al. [21].
For CIFAR10, instead, we considered a lightweight network
that, despite its size, allows obtaining high performances. The
two considered architectures are shown in Table ??, whereas
table II shows the model parameters that we used to train the
overmentioned architectures. The three layers considered by
the DNR classifier are the last three layers for the network
trained on MNIST, and the last layer plus the last batch norm
layer and the second to last max-pooling layer for the one
trained on CIFAR10 (chosen to obtain a reasonable amount of
features).
TABLE I
MODEL ARCHITECTURE FOR MNIST (LEFT) AND CIFAR10 (RIGHT)
NETWORKS
Layer Type Dimension
Conv. + ReLU 32 filters (3x3)
Conv. + ReLU 32 filters (3x3)
Max Pooling 2×2
Conv. + ReLU 64 filters (3x3)
Conv. + ReLU 64 filters (3x3)
Max Pooling 2×2
Fully Connected + ReLU 200 units
Fully Connected + ReLU 200 units
Softmax 10 units
Predicted outputs on known classes
cl
as
si
fie
r
g3
g2
g1
Threshold for detection of anomalous 
inputs, including adversarial examples
classifier with reject option, whose 
decision rule is: argmax(s1,...,sc,s0)
these classifiers try to predict the correct class 
from each given representation layerinput image
s1        ...      sc  s0
Fig. 1. Architecture of Deep Neural Rejection (DNR). DNR considers different network layers and learns an SVM with the RBF kernel on each of their
representations. The otputs of these SVMs are then combined using another RBF SVM, which will provide prediction scores s1, . . . , sc for each class.
This classifier will reject samples if the maximum score maxk=1,...,c sk is not higher than the rejection threshold θ. This decision rule can be equivalently
represented as arg maxk=0,...,c sk(x), if we consider rejection as an additional class with s0 = θ.
Layer Type Dimension
Conv. + Batch Norm. + ReLU 64 filters (3x3)
Conv. + Batch Norm. + ReLU 64 filters (3x3)
Max Pooling + Dropout (p = 0.1) 2x2
Conv. + Batch Norm. + ReLU 128 filters (3x3)
Conv. + Batch Norm. + ReLU 128 filters (3x3)
Max Pooling + Dropout (p = 0.2) 2x2
Conv. + Batch Norm. + ReLU 256 filters (3x3)
Conv. + Batch Norm. + ReLU 256 filters (3x3)
Max Pooling + Dropout (p = 0.3) 2x2
Conv. + Batch Norm. + ReLU 512 filters (3x3)
Max Pooling + Dropout (p = 0.4) 2x2
Fully Connected 512 units
Softmax 10 units
TABLE II
PARAMETERS USED TO TRAIN MNIST AND CIFAR10 NETWORKS
Parameter MNIST Model CIFAR Model
Learning Rate 0.1 0.01
Momentum 0.9 0.9
Dropout 0.5 (see table IV-A)
Batch Size 128 100
Epochs 50 75
Security Evaluation. We compare these classifiers in terms
of their security evaluation curves [2], reporting classification
accuracy against an increasing `2-norm perturbation size ε,
used to perturb all test samples. We consider adversarial
examples to be correctly classified if they are assigned either
to the rejection class or to their original class (which typically
happens when the perturbation is too small to cause a mis-
classification). For DNR and NR, we also report the rejection
rates, to highlight the fraction of correct rejections (i.e.,
adversarial examples) and wrong rejections (i.e., unperturbed
test samples).
Parameter setting. We use a 5-fold cross validation to select
the hyperparameters that maximize classification accuracy on
unperturbed training data. We set the rejection threshold θ of
NR and DNR using the same procedure to reject less than
5% training samples on MNIST, and less than 10% training
samples on CIFAR10.
B. Experimental Results
The results are reported in Fig. 3. In the absence of attack
(ε = 0), the undefended DNNs slightly outperform NR and
DNR, since they reject some legitimate samples. However, un-
der attack, (ε > 0), both defenses outperform the undefended
DNNs, and in particular DNR significantly outperforms NR,
exhibiting a much more graceful decrease in performance.
Interestingly, on MNIST, NR tends to reject more samples
for ε ∈ [1, 3], but its accuracy is lower than DNR. The
reason is that those adversarial examples that are not rejected
by NR are already misclassified at lower ε. Instead, even
though such samples may not be rejected by DNR, they are
correctly assigned to their true classes when DNR is used.
This means that DNR provides tighter boundaries closer to the
training classes than NR, thanks to the exploitation of lower-
level network representations, which makes the corresponding
defended classifier more difficult to evade. In particular, the
adversarial perturbations required to evade DNR are not only
Fig. 2. Our defense-aware attack against an RBF SVM with rejection, on a 3-class bi-dimensional classification problem. The initial sample x0 and the
adversarial example x? are respectively represented as a red exagon and a green star, while the `2-norm perturbation constraint ‖x0 − x′‖2 ≤ ε is shown
as a black circle. The left plot shows the decision region of each class, along with the reject region (in white). The right plot shows the values of the attack
objective Ω(x) (in colors), which correctly enforces our attacks to avoid the reject region.
Fig. 3. Security evaluation curves for MNIST (left) and CIFAR10 (right) data, reporting mean accuracy (and standard deviation) against ε-sized attacks.
typically larger in magnitude, but they also seem to be more
structured, trying to mimic more closely samples belonging
to different classes. This effect is quite evident in the case
of MNIST digits, as shown in Fig. 4, and to a lower extent
also in the case of CIFAR10 images, as shown in Fig. 5. For
instance, see how the bird image is altered to resemble the
shape of an airplane: the background pixels are manipulated
to represent the airplane cockpit and its tail. Notably, the truck
image is also modified to better resemble the shape of a car.
The perturbations crafted to evade DNR are more structured
since they are required to mimic the target class not only at
the output layer, but at lower representations too.
V. RELATED WORK
Different approaches have been recently proposed to per-
form rejection of samples that are outside of the training data
distribution [31]–[33]. For example, Thulasidasan et.al. [31]
and Geifman et.al. [32] have proposed novel loss functions
accounting for rejection of inputs on which the classifier is
not sufficiently confident. Guyon et.al. [33] have proposed
a method that allows the system designer to set the desired
risk level by adding a rejection mechanism to a pre-trained
neural network architecture. These approaches have, however,
not been originally tested against adversarial examples, and it
is thus of interest to assess their performance under attack in
future work, also in comparison to our proposal.
Even if the majority of approaches implementing rejection
or abstaining classifiers have not considered the problem of
defending against adversarial examples, some recent work
has explored this direction too [12], [13]. Nevertheless, with
respect to the approach proposed in this work, they have only
considered the output of the last network layer and perform
rejection based solely on that specific feature representation.
DNN NR DNR
3 attack(rejected)predicted class: 6
+ ε    
true class: 2
DNN NR DNR
9 8predicted class: 9
+ ε    
true class: 4
Fig. 4. Adversarial examples computed on the MNIST data to evade DNN, NR and DNR. The source image is reported on the left, followed by the (magnified)
adversarial perturbation crafted with ε = 5 (top) and ε = 7 (bottom) against each classifier, and the resulting adversarial examples. We remind the reader
that the attacks considered in this work are untargeted, i.e., they succeed when the attack sample is not correctly assigned to its true class. Note how DNR
enforces the attacks to better mimic samples from different classes, but remains able to reject even strongly-perturbed adversarial examples.
In particular, Bendale and Boult [13] have proposed a rejection
mechanism based on reducing the open-set risk in the feature
space of the activation vectors extracted from the last layer of
the network, while Melis et.al. [12] have applied a threshold
on the output of an RBF SVM classifier. Despite these
differences, the rationale of the two approaches is quite similar
and resembles the older idea of distance-based rejection.
Few approaches have considered a multi-layer detection
scheme similar to that envisioned in our work [14]–[16], [34],
[35]. However, most of these approaches require generating
adversarial examples at training time, which is computation-
ally intensive, especially for high-dimensional problems and
large datasets [14], [15], [34], [35]. Finding a methodology
to tune the hyperparameters for generating the attack samples
is also an open research challenge. Finally, even though the
DkNN approach by Papernot et.al. [16] does not require
generating adversarial examples at training time, it requires
computing the distance of each test sample against all the train-
ing points at different network layer representations, which
again raises scalability issues to high-dimensional problems
and large datasets.
DNN NR DNR
airplane attack(rejected)
predicted class: 
airplane
+ ε    
true class: 
bird
DNN NR DNR
automobile truckpredicted class: automobile
+ ε    
true class: 
truck
Fig. 5. Adversarial examples computed on the CIFAR10 dataset adding a perturbation computed with ε = 5 (top) and ε = 10 (bottom). See the caption of
Fig.4 for further details.
VI. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
We have proposed deep neural rejection (DNR), i.e., a
multi-layer rejection mechanism that, differently from other
state-of-the-art rejection approaches against adversarial ex-
amples, does not require generating adversarial examples at
training time, and it is less computationally demanding. Our
approach can be applied to pre-trained network architectures
to implement a defense against adversarial attacks at test
time. The base classifiers and the combiner used in our DNR
approach are trained separately. As future work, it would be
interesting to perform an end-to-end training of the proposed
classifier similarly to the approaches proposed in [31] and [32].
Another research direction may be that of testing our defense
against training-time poisoning attacks [2], [5], [36]–[38].
AVAILABILITY OF DATA AND MATERIALS
The dataset MNIST and CIFAR10 analysed in
this work are available respectively at the following
web pages: http://yann.lecun.com/exdb/mnist/ and
https://www.cs.toronto.edu/ kriz/cifar.html. [39], [40]
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